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Abstract
According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stan-
ley andWilliamson 2001; Stanley 2011; Brogaard 2008; 2009) knowledge-
how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then inso-
far as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with refer-
ence to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) ap-
proaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the
hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting differ-
ence between the two. However, insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches
to knowledge-how (e.g. Ryle 1946; 1949) are a viable option, there is an
overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active ex-
ternalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper ex-
plores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form
of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism
in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowl-
edge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the
extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in (on an
anti-intellectualist construal) when one knows how to do something, and
how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance.
1 Two kinds of active externalism
A recent and exciting area of research in contemporary philosophy of mind is
active externalism1, according to which cognition can be radically extended be-
yond the bounds of the biological agent. Different varieties of active externalism
1This term owes to Clark and Chalmers (1998), who distinguish active externalism from
‘passive externalism’, which they use to characterize the kind of externalism that is implied
by the view that mental contents are widely individuated (e.g. Putnam (1975); Burge (1986)).
For a representative example of some recent defences of active externalist views, see Clark and
Chalmers (1998); Clark (2008); Clark (2010); Menary (2006); Theiner, Allen, and Goldstone
(2010); Wilson (2000); Wilson (2004); Hutchins (1995); Palermos (2011) and Palermos (2014a;
2014b).
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correspond with the different ways cognition can be argued to ‘extend’ beyond
familiar bounds2.
One particularly strong version of active externalism is the extended mind
thesis (EMT)3, according to which an agent’s beliefs are claimed to, at least in
certain circumstances, supervene partly on things in the world, such as (for in-
stance) entries in a notebook or names saved in an iPhone. The extended mind
thesis (EMT) can be distinguished from the comparatively more popular, and as
we shall soon suggest, comparatively more defensible hypothesis of extended cog-
nition (HEC), according to which some cognitive processes (as opposed to beliefs
themselves) are argued to be transcranial in nature—viz., some cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g. such as the memorial process of information storage and retrieval)
are said to supervene on parts of the biological agent as well as on parts of the
world.
While some philosophers have been tempted to run the extended mind and
extended cognition theses together4—and particularly in such a way as to sup-
pose that these theses stand or fall together—this turns out to be a mistake.
One helpful way to appreciate this point is by considering just what kind of les-
son might be plausibly gleaned from Clark and Chalmers (1998) classic case of
‘Otto’, an Alzheimer’s patient who compensates for his failingmemory by always
carrying a well-organized notebook. The classic case proceeds as follows:
Otto: Otto suffers fromAlzheimer’s disease, and likemanyAlzheimer’s
patients, he relies on information in the environment to help struc-
ture his life. Otto carries a notebook aroundwith him everywhere he
goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he
needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook
plays the role usually played by a biological memory.
The Otto case has been used to make two related but importantly distinct
provocative philosophical points, both of which trade on the idea that Otto is
relying on his notebook in a way that is relevantly analogous to the way a non-
impaired individual relies on her biological memory. Let’s look at these in turn.
Firstly, themore provocative of the two points—onewhichClark andChalmers
opt for, and which concerns the nature of Otto’s beliefs—proceeds as follows:
with respect to the process of information storage and retrieval, Otto’s note-
book in the above case is playing a role that is functionally isomorphic to bi-
ological memory storage. In Otto’s case, the relevant storage happens to in-
2Put slightly differently, we might also say that different varieties of active externalism map
on to different strategies for combating what Clark calls ‘bioprejudice’—viz., when it is just on
account of something’s being located outside the skull and skin that it is excluded from cognition.
Active externalism is thus egalitarian in its approach to cognitive theorizing.
3There is a version of active externalism that is perhaps more radical by the lights of or-
thodoxy than the extended mind thesis. This is the distributed cognition thesis (e.g. Hutchins
(1995)). We’ll be setting this view aside for the present purposes.
4In fact, the seminal discussion (Clark & Chalmers 1998) is an example of such a running
together of EMT and HEC. See Palermos (2014a) for helpful discussion of the differences.
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volve the notebook. Thus, they reason that to the extent that we are prepared
to attribute to (for instance) an agent with a normally functioning biological
memory—Inga—a (non-occurrent, dispositional) belief that p simply in virtue of
Inga’s storage of p in her biological memory, we should likewise be prepared
to attribute to Otto an extended belief in virtue of his storage of the relevant
content in the notebook which they insist is playing the same functional role
as biological memory plays for Inga in the default case. Of course, the striking
aspect of this diagnosis of Otto’s case is that Otto’s belief is claimed to be partly
constituted by something in the world and which is extraorganismic—the entry
in the notebook. To the extent that the foregoing diagnosis of Otto’s situation is
compelling, EMT gains support, and we should accept that there are extended
beliefs.
But the ‘EMT’ reading of the Otto case, according to which we are encour-
aged to view the entries in the notebook as extended beliefs, has faced a number
of well-noted objections5. The most notable such objection is the objection from
cognitive bloat, what Allen-Hermanson (2013, 791) refers to as ‘superdupersizing
the mind’. Put simply, this objection highlights that functionalist arguments for
extended beliefs will be, as the argument goes, forced to countenance an ‘explo-
sion’ of such beliefs; for example, as Rupert (2004) has argued, if we allow that
Otto’s notebook contains extended beliefs, then it will be difficult to rule out
that—for instance—an individual who consults a phone book under normal cir-
cumstances counts as believing everything in the phonebook—an absurd result6.
Clark has attempted to rebut this kind of objection, by proposing what he calls
‘glue and trust’ criteria,7 criteria to be met by any non-biological candidates for
inclusion into an individual’s mental life; however, as Palermos (2014a; 2014b)
has observed, it’s not obvious that Clark’s stipulated criteria are ultimately nu-
anced enough to rule—as the proponent of EMT wants—that Otto’s case is
one featuring extended beliefs, while satisfactorily ruling out cases that fuel the
cognitive bloat objection. Thus, for one compelled to appeal to the Otto case
in support of a more egalitarian approach to thinking about cognition, it’s not
clear that the truth of EMT, specifically, is the philosophical lesson one should
be prepared to take from such cases.
Interestingly—and this is a point that often goes overlooked—Clark (2010)
himself thinks of beliefs as dynamic rather than static, and so in light of this, Clark
is happy for his own intents and purposes to run EMTandHEC together, where
the latter thesis claims that some cognitive processes can be transcranial in nature,
even if mental states themselves do not supervene on parts of the world external
5See, along with the bloat objection noted here, Adams & Aizawa’s (2008) objection to the
extended mind which draws from a distinction between derived and underived content.
6See here Rupert (2004, 401-405) and also Carter et al (2014).
7Clark’s (2010, 46) criteria are that: (1) “That the resource be reliably available and typically
invoked.” (2) “That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It
should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny. […] It should be deemed about as trustworthy
as something retrieved clearly from biological memory.” (3) “That information contained in the
resource should be easily accessible as and when required.”
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to the agent. But of course, if beliefs are antecedently regarded to be dynamic,
then HEC can be understood as trivially getting us to EMT.
What is important about this observation is that, for those who take a more
traditional view of belief, according to which beliefs are static (e.g. states) as op-
posed to dynamic processes, there is space to endorse HEC, the view that some
cognitive processes are transcranial, without going the further step and endors-
ing propositional attitudes, e.g. beliefs. This is a point one of the authors has
defended in several places8. Granted, this possibility would be of little relevance
if it should turn out that the objections to (and philosophical motivations for)
HEC are essentially the same as they are to, and for, EMT. However, as Paler-
mos (2014a; 2014b), Pritchard (2010), & Pritchard & Lynch (forthcoming) have
stressed in recent work, this is really not the case. For one thing—and this point
is straightforward—HEC, premised upon a more traditional conception of be-
lief, sidesteps the cognitive bloat objection for the simple reason that the claim
that some cognitive processes are extended does not entail the further thesis that
some beliefs, understood as static, are thereby extended, and the cognitive bloat
objection is premised upon the undesirability of an explosion of beliefs. Accord-
ingly, and to stress, any entailment from HEC to EMT would be on the table
only if one already, as Clark does, embraces an idiosyncratic dynamic picture of
beliefs.
Perhaps more interestingly, though, HEC gains support from both common-
sense functionalism—from which EMT draws the thrust of its support—but even
more, by dynamical systems theory, which motivates HEC directly and is silent
with respect to EMT (we’ll return to this shortly). This constitutes another rea-
son to think that EMT is not the most promising candidate view to take for one
who wants to avoid a ‘biologically prejudiced’ picture of human cognizing.
To appreciate these points, consider firstly, the point about functionalism.
Just as one might attempt to use the Otto case to motivate extended beliefs on
functionalist grounds, so onemight use the case tomotivate on such grounds ex-
tended cognitive processes. Here it will be helpful to considerClark&Chalmers’
‘Parity Principle’:
Parity Principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would
have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is part of the cognitive process (Clark and
Chalmers (1998, 8)).
With reference to the parity principle, there is a simple functionalist line
of argument for HEC, one which proceeds as follows: given that Otto’s note-
book plays for him the same functional role as biological memory plays for Inga
(who, recall, consults her normally functioning biological memory), we must
8See Carter (2013), Carter & Palermos (2014), Carter & Kallestrup (2015) and Carter &
Pritchard (forthcoming). See also Menary (2006) and Pritchard (2010).
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count Otto’s process of consulting his notebook as a part of a cognitive pro-
cess provided we count Inga’s process of consulting her biological memory as
part of a cognitive process—and the latter is of course paradigmatically a cog-
nitive process. The parity principle thus offers a straightforward way to reach
HEC—the claim that some cognitive processes can supervene at least partly on
what goes on beyond the biological agent. Thus HEC provides a neat way to
respect common sense functionalism in so far as it recommends an egalitarian
approach to theorizing about cognition, but without incurring the well-worn
problem of fending off the cognitive bloat objection which many critics take to
be the undoing of EMT.
But there may well be independent reasons to favour HEC over EMTwhich
go beyond the kind of commonsense functionalism that Clark& Chalmers take
to recommend EMT. As Palermos (2011; 2014a; 2014b) in particular has noted,
HEC, though not EMT, can be motivated on the basis of dynamical systems
theory (DST), the leading mathematical framework for studying the behaviour
of dynamical systems, construed more generally. In short, according to DST,
in order to claim that two (or more) systems give rise to an overall extended
or coupled system, what is needed, as Palermos notes, is the existence of non-
linear relations where non-linear relations that arise out of mutual interactions
between the contributing parts9. With reference to DST, we have a rationale
to countenance an extended cognitive system, provided the internal and external
parts interact mutually with each other; and, as Palermos argues, this is precisely
what we have in cases like that of Otto, where Otto goes back and forth to the
notebook, shaping its entries, where the entries then inform his behavior, when
then leads to new entries, etc., in a way where the causation is reciprocal, or
two-way, rather than one-way10.
Given the extent to whichHEC constitutes an egalitarian approach to think-
ing about cognition, is motivated by philosophical considerations that go be-
yond those which motivate EMT, and avoids the most significant philosophical
objection to EMT, it’s unsurprising that HEC has gained considerable trac-
tion in both the philosophy of mind and more recently in epistemology as the
most viable active externalist position on the table. In fact, one of the more
lively research programs at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and epis-
temology over the past several years has focused on potential implications of
HEC (rather than specifically EMT) for epistemological theory. Examples here
include Brogaard (2014), Hetherington (2012), Farkas (forthcoming), Menary
(2012), Pritchard (2010), Pritchard & Lynch (forthcoming), Jarvis (2014, forth-
9See here, along with Palermos 2011; 2014a; 2014b, Carter, et al. forthcoming, Chemero
2009, Froese et al. 2013; Sutton et al. 2008,;Theiner et al. 2010 and Tollefsen & Dale 2011.
10Compare the case of Otto, who mutually interacts with his notebook, with ‘one-way’ or
non-reciprocal causation, as we might have in an amended case where Otto does not interact
himself with the notebook by writing entries in it, but rather, simply relies on an external signal
to tell him what to do at each juncture. In a case where Otto simply accepts the instructions of
the signaler, the signaler is not (according to DST at least) a part of Otto’s extended cognitive
process, as the relevant causal relations are not mutually directed but one-way.
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coming) and Palermos (2014a; 2014b) to name a few.11
2 Extended knowledge—initial observations
Question: how might knowledge itself be extended? We submit, in an initial re-
sponse to this question, a relatively simple picture—one which, as we shall argue
in further sections, must be crucially amended. Firstly, if EMT (despite the ob-
jections that face it) is true, then since belief is a component of propositional
knowledge, it looks like knowledge will obviously be extended in the following
sense: EMT claims that belief is radically extended, and so if EMT is true,
knowledge inherits belief’s extendedness. For example, when Otto knows that
his doctor’s appointment is at 10:00, his knowledge can (according to EMT) su-
pervene in part on the entry in the notebook, which is itself, by EMT, part of
Otto’s extended belief.
Of course, one might attempt to undercut this point about the implica-
tion EMT has for extending propositional knowledge by suggesting, as Myers-
Schulz & Schwitzgebel (2013) have in recent work, that contrary to orthodoxy
within mainstream epistemology, belief is not necessary for knowledge, even if
belief usually features in cases of knowing. Or, one might opt for knowledge-
first approach (e.g. Williamson 2000) and deny that belief is ever a component
of knowledge. But unless one wants to take either of these heterodox routes, it
looks as though a direct answer to the question of how knowledge might be ex-
tended is to simply point out that if EMT is true, then propositional knowledge
will be extended via its belief component.
Along with this straightforward observation comes a connected ‘negative’
observation, which is HEC, without EMT, does not prima facie look on its own
sufficient tomotivating the view that some knowledge can be extended. After all,
and again unless we follow Clark and embrace a radically dynamic conception
of belief, all that really follows from HEC with respect to propositional knowl-
edge is that some knowledge will be the product of processes that themselves
can be transcranial in character. However, to say that some known proposition, p,
could be the output or deliverance of process that is itself extended is not to say that p, the
known proposition, is extended. And thus, as things appear, the following best an-
swers the question of how knowledge might be extended: knowledge—at least,
propositional knowledge—is going to be extended only if EMT is true, but not if
HEC is true.
Now, to combine this observation with the conclusion from the previous
section: given that HEC is comparatively a (much) better philosophically mo-
tivated position than EMT, the prospects to not look very likely that we should
end up with anything like extended knowledge. And if that’s right, then the kind
of active externalist programme12, more generally, might not have as significant
11See also Carter (2013), Carter & Palermos (2014), Carter & Kallestrup (2015) and Carter
& Pritchard (forthcoming).
12See fn. 1. This programme consists of the extended mind, extended cognition and dis-
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an impact in epistemological theory as we’d initially suspect.
However, in what follows, we want to suggest that this conclusion is far too
quick. Attention to knowledge-how reveals how a potential variety of extended
knowledge-how might be possible, and without the need to posit the kind of
extended mental states that lead EMT to face the objections which leave it com-
paratively less well motivated than HEC.
3 Knowledge How
Over the past 15 years or so—and indeed around the timeClark&Chalmers first
wrote their seminal paper on the extended mind—Stanley &Williamson (2001)
ignited in mainstream epistemology a revisiting of the presumed distinction,
a distinction widely assumed valid since (Ryle (1949); Ryle (1946)), between
knowing-how and knowing-that.
Ryle, in the service of challenging what he took at the time to be an anti-
quated and over-intellectualised picture of intelligent action13, had insisted that
when one knows how to ', this will be in virtue of one’s relevant abilities to ',
and not in virtue of any propositional attitudes one has14. Regardless of whether
Ryle’s arguments for this view in the middle of the 20th century were apt ones15,
tributed cognition programs. See Pritchard (2010), Palermos (2014a; 2014b) and Carter et al.
(2014) for more on this distinction.
13Ryle of course took himself to be challenging more generally Descartes’ picture of the mind
as a ‘ghost in the machine’ a picture on which action has intelligence properties only when
guided by acts of the mind—viz., the consideration of regulatory propositions. However, what
matters for the present purposes is that Chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind as well as Ryle’s 1945
Aristotelian Society Address constitute the seminal case for thinking, in particular, that knowing
how to do something is grounded in abilities, not (propositional) knowledge, and it is this picture
that has been inherited in mainstream epistemology, more or less, until recent challenges by
Stanley &Williamson and others on linguistic grounds.
14An even more simplified picture of the distinction between intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism goes like this: knowing how to do something just is having a certain ability or
disposition to do that thing; by contrast, intellectualism claims that knowing how to do some-
thing just is a kind of propositional knowledge. While Ryle probably endorsed something like
this simplified view of anti-intellectualism and Stanley andWilliamson (2001), as well as Stanley
(2011) endorse this simplified statement of intellectualism, we have resisted this kind of char-
acterization. This is because, following 1, we think the simplified picture runs together two
issues that can come apart. On the one hand, there is the issue of what grounds knowledge
how—e.g. what is it in virtue of which one knows how to do something. This is we think the key
question separating anti-intellectualist and intellectualists. One says propositional attitudes, the
other abilities. A separate matter altogether is what is the metaphysical nature of knowing how
to do something: here, for instance, an intellectualist can say that the nature of knowing how
to do something is a relation between an agent and a proposition, though this need not be one’s
answer to the nature question, simply in virtue of being an intellectualist about what grounds
knowledge how. For an example of an intellectualist proposal that is not ‘reductive’ (e.g. which
does not simply reduce the nature of knowing how to a propositional attitude relation), see
Bengson and Moffett (2011a).
15The recent emergence of linguistically-driven intellectualism has led a number of writ-
ers to go back and give sustained critiques of Ryle’s original ‘regress’-style arguments for anti-
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a consequence has been that mainstream epistemologists have widely taken for
granted that knowledge-how is something like ‘ability knowledge’ and crucially,
something that is very different from propositional knowledge. And it is this pic-
ture inherited from Ryle that Stanley &Williamson (2001) influentially tried to
turn on its head—on the basis of linguistic arguments—around the turn of the
21st century—bringing knowledge-how back on epistemologists’ radar.
This quick and dirty overview will help to set the stage for how—we think—
it is that EMTmight not be needed, after all, to get the result that knowledge (or,
at least, one important variety of knowledge) is radically extended. Consider that
the most popular form of intellectualism—reductive intellectualism—insists that
it’s not just that knowing how to do something is grounded in one’s propositional
attitudes, butmoreover, that knowing how to do something just is knowing some
fact—propositional knowledge16.
Obviously, if reductive intellectualism about knowledge how is correct, then
it will take EMT to generate the result that knowledge-how is extended. This
is because, to emphasise, on reductive intellectualist proposals, knowledge-how
is a kind of knowledge that—propositional knowledge—and as we saw in the pre-
vious section, for propositional knowledge to supervene on parts of the (extra
organismic) world, what would be needed is specifically EMT, and not HEC.
The line to this effect was just that, while a view (EMT) that claims that mental
states extend will generate the result that propositional knowledge is extended
via its extended belief condition, a view (HEC) that claims merely that processes
delivering beliefs extend will not generate this result. And thus, the result that
if reductive intellectualism about knowledge-how is correct, then the answer to
the question of how propositional knowledge might be extended is the same for
knowledge-how as for propositional knowledge.
However, things turn out to be different, and we think very interestingly so,
on an anti-intellectualist, rather than an intellectualist, construal of knowledge-
how. On the anti-intellectualist picture, the knowledge you have, for instance,
concerning how to ride a bike, is knowledge you have not in virtue of your propo-
sitional attitudes about the way for you to ride a bike, as the intellectualist would
tell us, but rather, in virtue of your possessing certain abilities. If this picture of
knowledge how is right, then while having certain beliefs might well be neces-
sary, for knowing how to do something (e.g. one can’t know how to fly a plane
to Paris without believing that a plane is the sort of thing that goes in the air17),
it will not be in virtue of any beliefs one has that one knows how to fly a plane
to Paris when one does. It will rather be in virtue of one’s abilities to do so.
Given that anti-intellectualists needn’t reduce knowledge-how to a kind of
propositional knowledge, the question of just how knowledge (of any sort) might
intellectualism about knowledge how. See here, for instance, Bengson and Moffett (2011b).
16For some examples of reductive intellectualism, see Stanley andWilliamson (2001); Stanley
(2011); Brogaard (2008) and Brogaard (2009). Cf. Bengson and Moffett (2011a); Bengson and
Moffett (2007) for some examples of non-reductive intellectualism.
17This point has been noted by Paul Snowdon (2004).
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be extended could potentially at least receive a very different kind of answer
when explored, specifically, through the lens of anti-intellectualist thinking about
knowledge-how. That is, it might well be that knowledge-how, on an anti-
intellectualist construal, could itself be defended as a variety of extended knowl-
edge even if one isn’t already impressed by arguments for EMT which aim to
establish the thesis that beliefs can be extended.
4 Extending Knowledge-How
A initial problem for the purposes of envisaging extended knowledge-how ma-
terializes: Framed against the background of HEC and EMT as our salient ac-
tive externalist options on the table, it looks as though the only way to moti-
vate extended knowledge-how would be, on intellectualist lines, to embrace the
implausible EMT and say that mental states such as beliefs (understood as con-
stituents of propositional knowledge) are extended. And given the implausibility
of EMT, this as we’ve suggested is not promising.
However, and this is the other side of the dilemma, things don’t look much
more promising—again, at least initially—in so far as we are going tomake sense
of extended knowledge-how on anti-intellectualist lines, either. The reason is
that, firstly, HEC does not on the face of things seem capable of generating
extended knowledge, per se, but only extended cognitive processes. And EMT
seems, in an obvious respect, entirely orthogonal to anti-intellectualist knowledge
how. After all, if knowledge-how is a matter of ability possession rather than the
possession of mental states such as propositional attitudes, then why think (a la
EMT) it could be extended through the extension of exactly the sort of thing the
anti-intellectualist insist does not ground knowledge-how? The prospects for
extended knowledge-how then seem to have run quickly into a dead end.
We think that the first step out of the puzzle is to attempt to reimagine
(first in the abstract, and then more concretely) just how the anti-intellectualist
might make sense of something in the neighbourhood of the extended mind
thesis, something that (as indicated above) isn’t initially clear given that the
anti-intellectualist explicitly distances herself from propositional attitudes in her
approach to theorizing about knowledge-how and its connection to skilled (in-
telligent) action.
To this end, the sketch we want to propose will be drawn by reference to an
adaptated version of Bengson & Moffett’s (2011b) framework for presenting—
and in doing so distinguishing between—intellectualism and anti-intellectualism
about knowledge-how, where each view is presented as a conjunction of two
kinds of claims:
(i) firstly, a claim that specifies when a given state is a state of knowing how
to do something, and
(ii) secondly, a claim that specifies when one counts as exercising one’s state of
knowing how to do something, e.g. as when performing an action.
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To emphasise the difference between the ways that intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism might interface with the extended mind thesis, we will use the
label “EM*” for the anti-intellectualist variant of EM. When fleshed with rel-
evant abstract template-particulars, the difference may be presented as follows
(cf. Bengson & Moffett, 2011b, pp. 7–9; 14–15):
EM-intellectualism
[ExtIKH STATE] A state  of an individual S is an extended state of
knowledge-how to ' if and only if  is or involves S’s having some
relevant extended propositional attitude (e.g. reliably produced belief
that p) regarding '-ing.
[ExtIKH ACTION] S exercises extended knowledge-how to ' in per-
forming an action ' if and only if S '-s and S has some state  such
that (i)  is or involves some relevant extended propositional atti-
tude regarding '-ing and (ii)  is appropriately causally related to
the production of S’s '-ing.
EM*-anti-intellectualism
[ExtAIKH STATE] A state  of an individual S is an extended state of
knowledge-how to ' if and only if  is or involves S’s having a cer-
tain type of extended ability or disposition (e.g. a trained, trainable,
multitrack disposition) to ', rather than propositional attitudes.
[ExtAIKH ACTION] S exercises extended knowledge-how to ' in per-
forming an action ' if and only if S '-s and S has some state  such
that (i)  is or involves a certain type of extended ability or disposi-
tion to ', rather than propositional attitudes, and (ii) S’s '-ing is the
actualization of .
The first andmost obvious difference betweenEM-intellectualism andEM*-
anti-intellectualism is that although the former associates mental states in the
traditional way, with propositional attitudes (or even attempts their reduction
to such attitudes), the latter ties mental states with abilities or dispositions. This
difference alone, however, need not be particularly illuminating if we approach
propositional attitudes themselves as (vacuously coarse-grained) dispositions to
act. It is, therefore, crucial to point to the second and much deeper differ-
ence which, in conjunction with the first, enables us to pinpoint EM*—what
is the anti-intellectualist’s distinctive variant of EM. The crucial difference, we
suggest, concerns how states posited by the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist are
brought to bear on action.
To put it crudely—and far from exhaustively—on the intellectualist picture,
knowledge-how, as brought to bear on action, involves a propositional-attitude
state  such that the relevant propositional attitude is, in oneway or another, tied
to the causal-antecedent of a chain of causally linked components within which
one finds some target component or a collection ' (e.g. bodily movement(s))
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to be achieved. The component or collection ' becomes non-accidentally suc-
cessful (in action), in virtue of , where  itself is understood as extrinsic to '.
By contrast, even though the anti-intellectualist may countenance, in her
story of how a state of knowing-how is exercised, some appropriately linked
chain of components, the anti-intellectualist shifts the focus from some high-
lighted components to the structure thereof and that in virtue of which this struc-
ture is non-accidentally stable and success-conducive. For many anti-intellectualists
the locus of knowledge-how will be ability or disposition and that, with causal
flavour added, generates an importantly different picture of the way in which
knowledge-how bears on action—that is, as an intrinsic rather than extrinsic el-
ement of ' .18
A more simple way to think about this difference is that, rather than as the
intellectualist does, positing a two-element relation where the only type of re-
lata are cause and effect, the anti-intellectualist builds in a further element to
underpin the two. This element, when actualised by the structure of the two el-
ements, plays the role of warrant for that structure’s stability which is conducive
to success. And further, if the structure forms a process, then non-accidental success
in action will function as an effect of that process. Most importantly, however,
insofar as the process provides the actualisation of the underpinning element
in question (i.e. ability or disposition), it will not suffice to say that the success
simply results from some antecedent component of the process19.
With this picture in hand, we are now in a much better position to render
EM*T intelligible (i.e. the extended mind thesis vis-à-vis anti-intellectualism);
that is, having sketched the idea that within EM*-anti-intellectualism abilities
can be modelled as mental states, we can return to the question: howmight such
states extend?
We suggest that the most straightforward answer to the above question20,
with respect to knowledge-how to ', is that a state of this sort extends through
the hybridisation of the biological categorical base for the requisite ability or disposition.
By that we do not wish to say—as could be suggested—that dispositions are sim-
ply reducible to their categorical bases. Indeed, for the present purposes all we
need here is the relevant functional characterisation of that which such bases—
which, when extended, form biological-non-biological substrates—afford to the
agent, when the agent has an ability or disposition to '.
Now, to positively motivate EM*Twe propose the following parity principle
for mental states.
18Recently Carter & Pritchard (2014) have offered a different approach featuring (actual)
achievement as candidate for knowledge-how.
19For more on this difference see, for example, Stout (2005).
20Note that, when EMT is applied tomental states, the claim about propositional knowledge-
how is that it may be—among other available options—an appropriately formed true belief with
some '-relevant content. But if in formulating EM*T we attempted to draw on a strict analogy
with EMT, we would arrive at the thesis whereby appropriately successful action is extended.
Although, actions seem to make good candidates for extension, there is no straightforward way
of construing them as mental states. This is why it seems more natural to attend to dispositions.
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Epistemic Parity Principle for States of Knowledge How: If S has the
ability to ', such that, were that ability biologically based, S knows
how to ', then S knows-how to '.
To make the connection with action clearer, consider a somewhat artificial
formulation of parity for exercises of knowledge-how in which parity for states is
already embedded. This is indeed how the anti-intellectualist may complement
the story in which the move from [ExtAIKH STATE] to [ExtAIKH ACTION] is made.
Epistemic Parity for Exercises of Knowledge-how: If S exercises an abil-
ity to' in such a way that, were that exercise a process grounded in
that ability and that ability biologically-based, S exercises knowledge-
how to ', THEN S exercises knowledge-how to '.21
The pieces are now in place to see how knowledge-how can be extended in
the sense of EM*T even if mental states (e.g. beliefs) aren’t extended in the sense of
EMT ; if knowledge how is at least in part a matter of possessing the ability to
', then extended knowledge will most plausibly, though not exclusively, feature
in cases as the ones below.22
Case I: Suppose Inga knows how to use an ATM machine to with-
draw money from her bank account. Call this, for short, knowing
how to '. On the anti-intellectualist line, Inga’s knowing how to do
this is largely a matter of her having an ability to ability to do so.
The ability to use an ATM machine in virtue of which Inga knows
how to use an ATM machine is exercised by the intracranial cogni-
tive process whose one component involves consulting her biologi-
cal memory for her PIN number (other plausible components being:
identifying an ATM machine, inserting her card, and entering her
PIN number). Now, suppose Clark and Chalmers’ hero Otto is like
Inga in all respects related to ATM machine operation, except that
he stores his PIN number in his notebook. Let C1 ( ) be the process
component which consists in storing/retrieving the PIN number in
the notebook. (i) C1 ( ) counts as part of a cognitive process, with
reference to epistemic parity for exercises and (ii) with reference the
Epistemic Parity Principle for Knowledge How states, Otto knows
how to use an ATM machine in virtue of having extended ability
based in part on his notebook.
21Note that insofar as this latter formulation is intended as expository rather than motiva-
tional, it does not attain the status of a principle. EM*T, as we envisage it here, is motivated
by Epistemic Parity Principle for States of Knowledge-How. Granting that Epistemic Parity
Principle for States of Knowledge-How holds, it simply entails the parity of exercises.
22This is because, one is in a position to speak about extended knowledge how in those cases
where it is not exercised. We will not rehearse examples to this effect here.
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Case II: Anna knows how to paint a (figurative) landscape. Again,
on the anti-intellectualist reading, her knowing how to paint land-
scapes is in part a matter of her having an ability to do so. Anna’s
ability to paint landscapes is exercised in part by the biological vi-
sual cognitive process of identifying and matching colours for ade-
quately representing what she sees in her visual field (other compo-
nents of this process including: spotting landscapes, using a selec-
tion of brushes, preparing the relevant palette by combining colours
in distinct ways). Compare Jens who resembles Anna in all respects
related to landscape paining, except that he suffers from deutera-
nopia, i.e. red-green type colour vision deficiency, and has to use
glasses with advanced colour identification software when picking
out reds and greens from within his visual field. Take C2 ( ) to be
the process component which consists in identifying colours of the
landscape and matching them with those on the palette or canvass.
We suggest that, other things equal, (i) C2 ( ) counts as part of a
cognitive process, with reference to epistemic parity for exercises
and (ii) with reference the Epistemic Parity Principle for Knowl-
edge How, Jens knows how to paint a landscape in virtue of having
an extended ability based in part on his glasses.
Although cases I and II are analogous, there are differences to be appreciated.
In line with the rulings of the Epistemic Parity Principle for States of Knowl-
edgeHow, Otto (Case I) and Jens (Case II) know how to use an ATM and paint a
(figurative) landscape, respectively. In so far as we are thinking of these abilities
as warrants of stability for success-conducive performances of both protago-
nists, Jens has the ability to paint landscapes which is no different from Anna’s.
However, when juxtaposed with Jens’s, Anna’s ability is biologically-based in an
important respect: her own (biologically situated) eyes afford to her—in a prim-
itive enabling sense—the development and preservation of her ability to paint.
Although, clearly, Jens’s ability isn’t entirely non-biologically based, his original
biological basis alone would not have afforded to him the development and/or
preservation of the ability to paint in the full spectrum of colours had the basis
not been supplemented, in this case, non-biologically.23 Only once an appropri-
ate supplementation is provided, will Jens have a sufficient base to enable him
to develop and preserve an ability to paint, such that colours in the full spec-
trum24 were functionally available to him as if he really experienced them. In
other words, Jens would not have been able to attain and preserve the same level
of ability as Anna without an appropriate supplementation.
Now, Otto’s situation, while similar to Jens’s in that his biological base re-
23Earlier we have mentioned hybridization of categorical base. Nonetheless, in cases such as
Jens’s it is easy to imagine that continuous advancements in the stem cell research will facilitate
the production of medium wavelength cones.
24By which we mean the range of colours available to an agent with normally functioning
visual system.
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quires supplementation as well, differs in one vital aspect: unlike Jens, Otto
would not have been fit to develop the relevant ability at all, and not just to a
different degree. To that extent that he would presumably develop some ability,
it would fall short of ability to use an ATM.
Accordingly, then, the relevant sense in which Otto’s and Jens’s abilities
count plausibly as extended now becomes clearer. Prior to the supplementa-
tion of the biological base, Otto and Jens were only in a position to develop
and/or preserve partial abilities. Whatever Otto’s ability would count as an abil-
ity to do, it would have fallen short of the threshold for abilities in the market
for knowledge-how to '; accordingly, there would be no point in even asking
whether the parity principle for states applies to him. Although Jens’s ability
would count as ability to ' and hence pertain to knowledge-how, there would
still be a sense in which Jens ability would fail to count as on a par with Anna’s.
This, at any rate, constitutes we think a plausible synopsis of the case pairs con-
sidered.
5 Concluding remarks
We’ve here developed a new way knowledge can be radically extended. In par-
ticular, we’ve shown that by turning our attention to knowledge-how, a thus-far
unconsidered avenue opens for seeing how knowledge itself can supervene on
parts of the world, and in a way that does not rely on the controversial thesis
that there are extended mental states of the sort that the traditional extended
mind thesis recommends. As such, our paper has attempted to carve out new
territory, both with respect to how knowledge-how might be conceived of as
extended, and more generally, with respect to the kind of implications theses in
the philosophy of mind can have for projects in mainstream epistemology25.
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